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Abstract
In contemporary times, Hundi has collected countless labels; the international
press has spurned innumerable villainous descriptions, the bulk of which have
helped to perpetuate a dense fog of notoriety. The critical problem lies in
definition. As there is an incomplete understanding of hundi’s form and remit,
there is also a rather limited understanding of why the system persists, set
against the backdrop of modern banking. In many ways the problem of definition
presented legal and financial authorities of the early and late twentieth century
with core issues which remain unresolved and problematic for authorities in
the twenty-first century. By drawing on archival and other historical material
pertaining to the system’s usage amongst Indian merchants, this paper attempts
to tackle much of the confusion and many misconceptions surrounding hundi.
The discussion explores the idea that hundi is more accurately described as an
indigenous banking system endowedwith a complex range of functions, but whose
central purpose is trade.
Introduction
It is perhaps ironic that an ancient South Asian banking system
which had earned a reputation for trust should today be widely
regarded as an opprobrious marker of the black market economy. Also
known as hawala, havala, or havale, hundi’s disrepute is reflected in the
many villainous descriptions awash in the international press: ‘illegal
financial transactions market’,2 ‘black money’ and ‘drug money’,3
1 I would particularly like to thank JohnHarriss,GarethAustin, TirthankarRoy and
last, but not least, Alexander Evans for excellent guidance, comments and unfailing
encouragement. Any errors are purely my own.
2 M. Rama Rao, Finance Minister Interviewed on Inflation, IMF, Subsidies, 1545 GMT,
22 June, 26 June 1993. LexisNexis, accessed 2004.
3 Erhard Haubold, “Spekulationen ueber die Rolle der indischen Mafia (Specul-
ation over the role of the Indian Mafia),” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH 1993.
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‘system of tax evasion’,4 ‘illegal transfers of foreign exchange’,5 ‘illegal
money laundering network’6 and Hindi word meaning ‘providing a
code’.7 In a similar vein, the descriptions of hawala and hundi as
informal or alternative8 have developed because they are perceived as
both unofficial and lacking in legal accountability. The confusion does
not cease there; there is no universal agreement over whether hundi
and hawala are in fact the same, and, just as press descriptions have
been wildly different, this uncertainty has much to do with diverging
opinions of what hundi and hawala respectively are.
In many ways, the notoriety collected by hundi and hawala
is connected to what Austin and Sugihara correctly describe as
the broader ‘disparaging’ connotations of the words informal or
‘unorganised’.9 The authors argue such negative connotations arise
from the persisting dominant view that indigenous or traditional
banking and its instruments were primitive and inefficient. Yet, whilst
developments in modern banking appear to render hundi obsolete,
emerging contemporary studies that demonstrate the continued use
of hundi/hawala indicate otherwise.
The critical problem lies in definition. As there is an incomplete
understanding of hundi/hawala’s form and remit, there is also a
rather limited understanding of why the system persists, set against
the backdrop of modern banking. In turn, this presents enormous
difficulties for law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities.
This paper draws on archival and other historical material pertaining
to the system’s usage amongst Indian merchants, in order to
tackle confusion and misconceptions surrounding what hundi/hawala
actually is. Trade, it will be argued, is the primary function of the
system. This discussion will demonstrate that problems of definition
presented legal andfinancial authorities of the early and late twentieth
4 Philip Coggan, “The Chronology of Corruption,” The Financial Times 1991.
LexisNexis, accessed April 2004.
5 Shirish Nadkarni, “Confidence in Tatters Over Hawala Fallout,” South China
Morning Post 1996. LexisNexis, accessed June 2004.
6 Chhaya Mayank, “Diaries Tell a Sordid Story of Corruption,” India Abroad 1996.
Lexis Nexis, accessed June 2004.
7 “India Cash Market Tied to Burgeoning Scandal; Funds from Abroad Key
Hawala Deals,”Chicago Tribune (sourced from the Associated Press) 1996. LexisNexis,
accessed June 2004.
8 Widely used by Interpol, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) for instance.
9 Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara, eds., Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World
1750–1969; Austin et al., Introduction (1993), p. 2.
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century with core issues which remain unresolved for authorities in the
twenty-first century. It concludes that legal and financial policies will
remain problematic unless a proper understanding of hundi/hawala is
achieved.
The considerable historical literature on hundi is also partly to
blame for confusion over whether hundi and hawala are one and
the same. Contemporaries effectively disagree over whether hawala
possesses all the functions of hundi, or if it simply serves as a
remittance vehicle. El Qorchi et al. portray hawala and hundi as
interchangeable entities,10 yet Ballard distinguishes between the two,
describing hundi as a letter of credit or promissory note that was
once used by hawaladars (hawala operators) to document debt.11
Passas too asserts that hundi and hawala should be distinguished,
describing hundi as an ancient credit instrument, which ‘functioned
as a remittance vehicle, as an IOU, and as a bill of exchange.’12
Hawala, Passas claims, ‘is simply the practice of transferring money
from place to place’, which in modern times largely does not involve
the use of hundi.13 He contends that hundi is often confused with
hawala because, like the latter, it too serves as a remittance vehicle.
Yet Jost and Sandhu conclude that hundi and hawala are the same,
since hundi also means trust in Hindi, deriving from the Sanskrit root
Hundmeaning ‘to collect’. They point out that in common with hundi,
hawala also carries the same senses of bill of exchange, promissory
note, and reference. Rather strangely however, in the same paper,
they define hawala as an ‘alternative or parallel remittance system’,
and also state that the system ‘makesminimal (oftenno) use of any sort
of negotiable instrument’.14 So is hawala/hundi simply a remittance
vehicle? Or does it too serve as a credit instrument? And how accurate
are the above definitions of hundi and hawala?
10 Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel M. Maimbo and John F. Wilson, Informal Funds
Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, IMF/WorldBank (Washington,
D.C.: 2003).
11 Roger Ballard, “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial
Integrity within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The Operational Dynamics
of Contemporary Hawala Networks,” Journal of Banking Regulation 6(4) (2005); Roger
Ballard, The Principles and Practice of Hawala Banking (2002 [cited April 2003]), p. 7.
12 Nikos Passas, “Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money
Laundering,” National Institute of Justice, 2003, p. 37.
13 Ibid., p. 39.
14 Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, “The Hawala Alternative Remittance
System and Its Role inMoney Laundering,” Lyon: Interpol General Secretariat, 2000,
p. 5.
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Linguistic Affinities Compared
A comparison of hundi and hawala in Hindi, Arabic and Sanskrit
reveals strong linguistic affinities and functional similarities. In
modern standard Hindi, the senses of trust, contract and promise are
implicit in both hundi and hawala. McGregor’s authoritative Oxford
Hindi-English Dictionary15 describes hundi as a bill of exchange, draft
and a promissory note, whilst the entry hunda states, ‘an inclusive
agreement or contract’, or hunda-bhadha as a contract for delivery
of goods free of charge, or for insurance. Hawala, as represented
by havala in Hindi, is defined as ‘charge, keeping’, or ‘reference,
allusion’, and its etymology is attributed to Arabic. Modern standard
Arabic translates hawala as transfer, which perhaps explains why
more authoritative accounts have defined the system as Informal Value
Transfer System (IVTS)16 and Informal Funds Transfer system (IFT).17 The
word hawala is the verbal noun formof the verb haaˆla, whichmeans the
transformation of a situation in which a person or thing finds itself.18
Scrutiny of Monier-Williams’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary reveals no
entry for hawala/havala, or hundi. However, hundika,19 the entry most
closely approximating hundi, is described as ‘a bill of exchange, bond,
Rajat, assignment or order’, and its etymological roots are ascribed to
Persian.
Historical Connections Between Hundi and Hawala
Although it is impossible to pin down the precise chronology and roots
of either hawala or hundi, strong linguistic, political and economic
historical connections between India, Persia and the Middle East
suggest that similarities between the two systems are not merely
coincidental. Arabic’s influence on Persian is well documented, as
15 McGregor, Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993).
16 Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organisations: A Study into
So-Called Underground Banking Networks (Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 2000), p. 11.
17 El Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System.
18 Richard Grasshof, Das Wechselrecht der Araber: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie ueber die
Herkunft des Wechsels (Berlin: Otto Liebmann, 1899), p. 37.
19 Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Etymologically and
Philologically Arranged) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899), p. 1301.
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is the replacement of Sanskrit with Persian as the administrative
language of North India during the Mughal period. Globalisation in
the form of mercantile trade throughout these regions is also likely to
have had a significant impact on the language of business. For instance,
an intriguing Financial Times report20 provides the sense that the
Arabic term hawala was adopted because of increasing trade activities
with the Persian Gulf or Middle East more generally. Reporting on
Bahraini settlers at the turn of the nineteenth century, Field describes
hawala as the name of Sunni Arabs originating from Arabia, who had
settled on the Iranian coast before coming to Bahrain. Most of these
settlers are said to have had strong trading connections in a variety of
spheres.
Field also relates the arrival of an Indian merchant community
in Bahrain. This merchant community had apparently ‘dealt with
the Bahraini pearl traders in Bombay and were drawn to the island
by the prospect of buying pearls locally or importing food or other
basic supplies to sell to the pearling dhows.’21 The name hawala may
well have been adopted within the Indian subcontinent through active
trade with the Persian Gulf in the twentieth century. This does not
mean that the system was not employed before this point. In fact,
the rich literature surrounding merchant castes and their financial
activities provides many strong indicators of the existence of such
systems.
Functional Similarities Between Hundi and Hawala
Historical accounts detailing usage of hundi and hawala also strongly
point to the two systems being the same. Both were at the heart
of trade in India and the Middle East, and both were exercised as
the chief banking instrument of merchants. Hawala was not merely a
remittance vehicle; it had the same function as hundi, even if linguistic
dictionary entries do not convey this sense adequately. Both the 1927
and 1961 entries in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, though authored by
different individuals, are unanimous in defining hawala as a ‘bill’ or
20 Michael Field, “An Island of Mixed Communities,” Financial Times (retrieved
from LexusNexis May 2004) 1983. Famous trading families of such origin are Kanoo,
Almoayed and the Fakhroos.
21 Ibid.
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‘draft’, ‘cheque’ or ‘assignment’, by which a transference or claim of
debt is made possible22—all functions identical to those of hundi.
Boxing hawala into a single category does not adequately convey
the sense of hawala. In the early twentieth century, within the
context of growing developments in modern banking, technology and
regulations, hawala/hundi undoubtedly had modified functions and
connotations for Indian merchants and the Indian economy more
generally. The nuanced nature of this indigenous banking system
(IBS) is captured even in 1899 with Grasshof’s analysis of Arab
exchange laws; here he recommends caution in the treatment of
hawala, emphasising the need to distinguish between hawala as an
institution which has been integrated with specific Muslim laws, and
hawala’s specific meaning for Islamic culture and economic life.
Bei der Abhandlung der hawala haben wir also, um erscho¨pfend zu sein,
folgenden Weg einzuschlegen: zuna¨chst betrachten wir das Institut der
hawala, wie es sich, systematisch gegliedert, in dem Kopfe eines bestimmten
muslimischen Juristen malt, sehen dann in besonderen Exkursen, welche
von der Auffassung dieses Juristen abweichende Ansichten u¨ber wichtigere
Punkte sich bei anderen finden, und suchen endlich die Bedeutung der hawala
fu¨r das islamische Kultur—und Wirtschaftsleben festzustellen. 23
Thus, when examining the havala, in order to ensure thoroughness, we have
to follow this procedure: first, we consider the institution of the havala, the
way in which it is systematically structured in the mind of a Muslim legal
professional. Then we pursue certain issues which will lead us to views on
certain points which deviate from those of the Muslim legal professional.
Finally, we will at last determine the significance of the havala for the Islamic
culture and economy.
The link between hundi/hawala and trade has long been
understated; contemporary voices appear to regard the system
alternately as a remittance vehicle or conduit for crime. While both
aspects of the system are correct, the missing piece is trade. Although
there is little contemporary primary research to carry forward the
assertion that hundi/hawala’s primary function remains trade, there
is a considerable body of historical literature which demonstrates that
this was a core function right up until the late twentieth century.
Again, the extent to which it was used for trade remained uncertain
22 EI 1927, 1971.
23 Grasshof, Das Wechselrecht der Araber: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie ueber die Herkunft
des Wechsels, p. 15.
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as exemplified by the Indian Banking Commission’s 1971 report on
Indigenous Bankers:
Many regarded the hundi as representing a genuine trade bill and not merely
an accommodation bill24, but there is nothing in the face of the hundi to
indicate that it arises out of a genuine trade transaction, nor is it supported
in most cases by any documentary evidence indicating despatch of goods as
is the case with bills of exchange. Hundis perform one or other of these three
function, viz., they are instruments used to: i) raise money, ii) remit funds
and iii) finance inland trade. Because the hundi performs one or other of
the above essential functions, it has been used throughout the century for
generations and its popularity has not significantly waned.25
In his analysis of Shikarpuri and Sindhi merchants, Markovits
defines the merchant network as ‘a structure through which goods,
credit, capital and men circulate regularly across a given space which
can vary enormously in terms of both size and accessibility.’26 Hundi
had a unique position within this network; it served first and foremost
as credit, but its importance and successful implementation both
within and outside the merchant network, lay in its close relationship
with goods, capital and the merchants themselves. Hundi wove
together credit, goods, capital and the merchants themselves in an
extraordinarily cohesive fashion. Largely understated and dismissed
in colonial discourses, hundi was not well understood outside Indian
merchant communities, and hence its unique institutional character
has been shrouded in obscurity.
Historically, hundi has been subsumed within the broader
classification of indigenous banking. However, even this category has
not escaped its share of problems. Within the context of South Asia,
the term indigenous banking has always proved notoriously hard to
delineate. Jain touched upon this in 1929, when he said that there
was ‘no legal definition of the term “indigenous banker” available.’27
In 1931, the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee stated that
use of the term indigenous banker had done a disservice to India. Its
statement rested on information collected by the various Provincial
24 Definition of an accommodation bill taken fromWikipedia: “An Accommodation
Bill is as its name implies, is a bill of exchange accepted and sometimes endorsed
without any receipt of value in order to afford temporary pecuniary aid to the
person accommodated.” Retrieved: 24 August 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Accommodation_Bill.
25 “Report of the Study Group on Indigenous Bankers,” Bombay: Banking
Commission; Government of India, 1971, p. 47.
26 Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants 1750–1947: Traders of Sind
from Bukhara to Panama (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 25.
27 L.C. Jain, Indigenous Banking in India (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 1.
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BankingEnquiryCommittees, which demonstrated the eclectic nature
of agents falling within this broad category. It reasoned, did the name
indigenous carry any real meaning if ‘different types and varieties
of bankers and moneylenders engaged in small functions and large
functions, mixed up with land, the trade in precious metals, the trade
in grain down to peddling’ all fell under the single classification?28
However, the term indigenous banking, whilst undoubtedly
encompassing a large arena, is useful in distinguishing traditional
banking instruments such as hundi, from the modern or so-called
formal banking sector. Most commonly described as a bill of exchange,
promissory note, letter of credit and remittance vehicle, hundi more
accurately is both an indigenous banking system and indigenous
banking instrument, although in modern times it is only regarded as
a remittance vehicle. Writing in 1960, ironically, Habib distinguished
hundi from ‘ordinary’ bills of exchange on precisely opposite grounds,
stating that hundi served as an ‘instrument for raising short term
credit repayable at another place’, but that during the Mughal period
‘it was also employed to transmit money from one place to another.’29
It seems reasonable to surmise that hundi’s dominant function has
varied over time, closely mirroring the needs of its agents and their
political and economic contexts. In the course of theMughal era, hundi
performed as both the instrument and the systemof deposit banking. A
hundi drawn by a sarraf or shroff (money changer or banker) to expedite
remittances might very well be considered a deposit accepted by the
sarraf. In like fashion, the sarraf was actually lending money when he
discounted a hundi.30
The chief function of hundi amongst Indian merchants is largely
believed to have been its ability to alleviate the need for specie,
particularly when travelling across arduous and often dangerous
terrain. This was undoubtedly true of the caravan trade where
hundi appears to have served primarily as a letter of credit, or bill
of exchange. Examining the Shikarpuri merchants’ caravan trade
between 1750 and 1947, Markovits argues that hundi had particular
importance because no other credit instrument was available at the
time.31
28 “Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 Minority Report,”
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1931, p. 100.
29 Irfan M. Habib, “Banking in Mughal India,” in Contributions to Indian Economic
History I, ed. Tapan Raychaudhuri (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), p.8.
30 Ibid., p. 17.
31 Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants 1750–1947: Traders of Sind from
Bukhara to Panama, p. 186.
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However, there are a number of historical texts which illustrate
that hundi’s function amongst Indianmerchants wasmore varied both
within and outside the caravan trade. In the arresting seventeenth-
century autobiographical poem the Ardhakatha¯nak, the author, a Jain
merchant from Jaunpur, describes the use of a hundi which operated
rather like a promissory note: ‘The hundi against which my father had
borrowed money earlier in Jaunpur had now fallen due. I received it
and paid out the required sum.’32
Hundi in the sense of a promissory note was remarkably ubiquitous,
and certainly in the late eighteenth century, commercial agents of
the East India Company regularly used to accept ‘hoondian on bills
granted by the Shroffs’, for delivery of cash, which were later payable
in silver from theCompany treasury.33 The use of hundis by the British
also had the effect of socially elevating Indian trading families.34
This suggests that the ubiquity of hundis was strongly connected to
merchant reputation and vice versa.
Indian merchants frequently served as traders and moneylenders
because they usually had access to extremely large pools of capital. In
this way, hundis were used to remit funds in the case of the caravan
trade, but also to finance other activities either within the host country
or countries in which merchant networks had a presence. Hundis
could have great reach if ratified by a merchant community of great
repute; similarly, the circulation of hundis issued by specific merchant
communities served to further the network’s reputation.
During the late eighteenth century, there was a sanguine
relationship between North Indian merchant capital in the form of
hundi and the flourishing of the British East India Company. Hundi
transactions were extraordinarily versatile, providing for military and
administrative expansion into the rural heartland as well as important
towns.35 Bayly is among those who regard the British administration’s
later replacement of hundi with district treasury bills as a sign that
links between Indian merchants and the British had attenuated. Yet,
as we shall see later on, certain historical documents reveal that the
British remained dependent on a number of merchant communities
32 Banarasidas, Ardhakathanak (1641), trans. Mukund Lath (Jaipur: Rajasthan
Prakrit Bharati Sansthan, 1981), p. 315.
33 Accountant Generals’ Office correspondence to Earl Cornwallis K. G., Governor
General in Council in the Public Department of Fort William, 11th June 1789.
34 C. A. Bayly, Rulers Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British
Expansion 1770–1870 (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 241.
35 Ibid., p. 211.
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for trade. District treasury bills never succeeded in replacing the use
of hundi amongst Indian merchants.
An undeveloped transport and communication infrastructure across
India massively impaired the reach and overall competence of modern
banking,36 perhaps explaining why hundi remained a dominant
feature of the Indian economy more generally during the nineteenth
century. In the nineteenth century, the hundi system employed its
own couriers across the breadth of the country knitting India’s
domestic economy together through its reliable networks, in a hitherto
unparalleled fashion. Some historians rather erroneously believe that
the advent of the railway, cable and the telegraph subordinated the
use of hundi by the late nineteenth century,37 yet British colonial
government records attest to the continued mainstream use of hundi
by Indian merchants well into the twentieth century. In fact, as the
accounts below demonstrate, the Government of India had attempted
to find ways of replacing the use of hundi within trade on several
occasions, with no success.
Hundi Proved Difficult to Substitute
In 1908 the Government of Bombay ‘strongly opposed’ the suggested
adoption of ‘a system of exportation of opium in bond’ as a substitute
for the hundi system. The reason for this considerable resistance was
that this alternative bond system was seen to entail ‘the payment
of a stamp duty at a higher rate than that leviable on a hundi.’ It
was also found that the exportation in bond would not circumvent
the problem of interest lost through the hundi system.38 There were
other more compelling reasons for rejecting the introduction of the
bond system: the strength of the hundi system amongst merchants in
Bombay, and the system’s ability to ‘afford protection in transit’ whilst
36 S. M. Dhume, The Evolution of Banking in India Part II (Bombay, India: Examiner
Press & Publishers, 1926), p. 98.
37 Rajat Kanta Ray, “Indigenous Banking and Commission Agency in India’s
Colonial Economy,” in Money & Credit in Indian History, ed. Amiya Kumar Bagchi
(New Delhi, India: Tulika Books, 2002), p. 119; Dhume, The Evolution of Banking in
India Part II, p. 98.
38 Correspondence from Lieutenant-Colonel H. Daly, Agent to the Governor
General in Central India and Opium Agent in Malwa, to The Secretary to the
Government of India, Finance Department, 9th January 1908.
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demanding expenditure which was ‘a mere trifle compared with the
value of trade’.39
Trade between Afghanistan and India reached a virtual standstill
when the Afghan government stopped the issue of exchange hundis on
Peshawar in 1940. Hundi represented the primary form of Indian
exchange, since Afghan law prohibited merchants from bringing
Afghan or British currency to India from Afghanistan. The precise
impact of this on Indian traders and the local economy is described as
follows:
These firms and others, who are dealing with Afghanistan say that money
between 15 to 20 Lakhs has been lost in Afghanistan, and that the business
has suffered badly because neither are they able to make purchases nor
dispense with their servants, carters etc. They also state that if this state of
affairs continues it will dislocate the market and lead to the commission of
crime because of the unemployment of many people.40
In 1945, the Government of India revoked a customs notification
which prohibited all legal currency tender, including cheques, hundis
and all other bills of exchange, from being brought into British India
across its customs frontiers in the east of India and north of Assam,
without explicit permission.41 Correspondence from the Governor
of Assam’s office to the Finance department sought to highlight
the extreme difficulty this would impose on trade within the region
between Tibetan and Chinese merchants:
3. Hundies and bills of exchange provide these traders with the greatest
portion of their purchasing power and almost all larger traders bring such
hundies mostly on firms at Kalimpong. It is impossible for these traders to
obtain the necessary permission of the Central Government or of the Reserve
Bank of India before entering India.
4. If this order is to be put into force hundies, bills of exchange, Indian coins
and currency notes cannot be brought into India and this will stifle 80% of
the trade now being carried on, and will create adverse feeling in South East
39 Correspondence from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to the
Honourable Agent to the Governor General in Central India, 18th December 1907.
40 Express letter from the Chief Secretary to Government of the North West
Frontier Province, to the Foreign Office in Simla, 15th July 1940.
41 Cancellation of the customs notification: “Rose, W.A.—Under Secretary to the
Government of India to The Secretary to the Governor of Assam, Shillong, 24th April
1945, C. No. 114-Cus. II/45. Sadiya Frontier Tract—Hundies and Bills of Exchange
Brought byTibetan andChineseTradersComing via Lohit Valley Route—Prohibition
against—Relaxation of,” ed.NationalArchives of India (Simla, India: ExternalAffairs,
Central Asian, Progs. nos. 491-X, 1937).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Nov 2012 IP address: 158.143.193.43
920 MARINA MARTIN
Tibet and in the long run throttle trade between Mishmis and the Zayuli
Tibetans.42
Even still, despite its ubiquity and critical importance to trade,
hundi’s indigenous character and the particular rules governing its
usage amongst Indian merchants seem to have marked it as different
to other financial instruments. The Madras Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal had already defined hundi as an instrument that was written
in vernacular languages only.43 The Indian Negotiable Instruments
Act (NIA) passed in 1881 defined hundi as a negotiable instrument.
However, it was not affected by the provisions of the act because local
usage of instruments in an oriental language was exempted.44 Yet, on
the other hand, exhibits retained by the Reserve Bank of India, and
specimens within the 1971 Report of the Study Group on Indigenous
Bankers, reveal that hundis were written in English as well. So again,
we are left with the unsatisfactory conclusion that hundis were not
well understood.
In 1930, the Report of the Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry
Committee maintained that hundi was not defined in law, and
was moreover ‘used loosely in commercial and banking circles to
mean a credit document in any language emanating from or drawn
upon persons carrying on business according to Indian methods.’45
The 1971 report on Indigenous Bankers revealed that the Indian
government and the modern banking sector continued to find hundis
both perplexing and difficult to govern. It also sums up the historical
problem of defining this indigenous financial instrument:
Hundis are, by and large, instruments in vernacular languages and a number
of bewildering local usages govern these instruments, though they are
inconsistent with the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
42 “Letter no. L.30/45 G.S from P. F. Adams, Esqr., Secretary to the Governor
of Assam, to The Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Finance Department
(Central Revenues), Shillong, the 27th March, 1945,” ed. National Archives of India
(External Affairs, Central Asian, Progs. nos. 491-X, 1937).
43 Madras ITAT cases: M. K. A. Chimiaswamy Nadar & Sons 14 TTJ 546;
Grahalakshmi & Co. 2 ITD 420, as cited in Dilip Lakhani, Amount Borrowed or
Repaid on Hundi—Section 69D (Laws4India.com, Lex Infotax (India) Pvt. Ltd. [cited
18 November 2005]); available from http://www.laws4india.com/corporatelaws/
commentary/cc/cc5.asp.
44 Ibid.
45 “Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee 1929–30,
Volume I” (Bombay, 1929–30), p. 149.
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Although a credit instrument dating from antiquity, it has never been defined
by any authority on banking.46
The problem of defining hundi also stems from seeking comparison
with European credit instruments and banking facilities. The hundi
was rather different to the European bill of exchange because it was
used to remit funds and to raise different forms of credit. There are, in
fact, many types of hundis; the diverse function of each hundi makes it
difficult to squarely apply the usual labels of promissory note, bill
of exchange or system of advancing loans. This was compounded
by the Indian government’s struggle to document hundi usage
and enforcement amongst multiple mercantile communities. This
complexity is reflected in the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee
reports of the 1930s, which covered regions as far afield as Bombay,
Bengal, Madras and Burma.
Despite some differences in name, and customs in banking, in
essence North Indian merchant hundi systems appear to roughly
correspond with that of South Indian merchants. All merchants
had two broad categories of hundi: demand or sight hundis known
as Darshani47 or Dharsan,48 which were payable either straightaway
or within a few days of presentation, and usance or fixed-term
hundis known as Muddati or Thavanai,49 whose maturity period might
be anywhere between 30 and 120 days. Within these two broad
categories, individual merchant communities had a number of other
classes of hundis, which differed in terms of the type of bearer or
drawee, or goods despatched. Understandably, the rate of interest
charged would vary according to the type of bearer. Some merchant
communities additionally had broad hundi categories which served
either a particular function, such as dowry, or were discharged purely
for use within the specific merchant group.50
The full range of hundis within key merchant communities, such
as the Marwari, Nattukottai Chettiar, Shikarpuri or Multani and the
46 “Report of the Study Group on Indigenous Bankers” [NMML], Bombay: Banking
Commission; Government of India (1971), p. 46.
47 Ibid., p. 47.
48 “Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Vol. 1: Banking and Credit in
Burma” (Rangoon, 1930); David Rudner, Caste and Capitalism in Colonial India: The
Nattukottai Chettiars (University of California Press, 1994), Berkeley, p. 93.
49 “Report of the Study Group on Indigenous Bankers,” p. 47.
50 Rudner, Caste and Capitalism in Colonial India: The Nattukottai Chettiars,
pp. 93–94.
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Gujarati shroffs,51 were so well articulated and implemented that the
1971 report on indigenous bankers observed, ‘some of the usages of the
hundis are said to give better facilities than corresponding provisions
of theNegotiable Instruments Act.’52 Customs ruling the use of hundis
may have varied according to each merchant group, yet irrespective,
according to literature on the subject, seldom did a situation arise
where hundis were dishonoured.
In fact, hundi/hawala was an institution which served Indian
merchants particularly well because it embodied economic and
cultural sanctions. Seen from this light, it has explanatory power for
understanding howmercantile networks have dominated the business
world in India for centuries. In his work on one such successful
mercantile community, the Marwaris, Timberg emphasises the need
to ‘re-examine the functions of traditional commercial and social
values and institutions as they are used by trading communities in
the transition to modern forms of economic activity’. He suggests that
perhaps these very values and institutions have been responsible for
the success of commercial communities.53
The IBS was one such institution, more obviously facilitating
the mercantile network’s access to capital, credit and goods, but
with a second equally important function of building on and even
enhancingmerchant reputations, in a kind of harmonious loop. Family
reputation, as described earlier, directly influenced the extent towhich
a hundi was circulated; widespread circulation or usage of hundi by
influential persons strengthened the merchant network’s status and
increased the merchants’ access to capital, credit and goods.
Revising Conceptions of Hundi/Hawala and Informality
To understand exactly how this would have worked, hundi/hawala
should be understood as a more formal institution than is commonly
understood today. The contemporary labels informal or alternative
applied to hundi/hawala underscore the system’s unofficial status; this
is a position reflected in India’s prohibition of the system today, as well
51 Key indigenous banking communities as defined in the “Report of the Study
Group on Indigenous Bankers,” pp. 24–43.
52 Ibid., p. 52.
53 Thomas A. Timberg, TheMarwaris: From Traders to Industrialists (New Delhi, India:
Vikas, 1979), p. 16.
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as approaches by regulatory bodies such as the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF). These terms indicate the widespread contemporary
understanding that hundi/hawala is somehow radically different from
modern or so-called formal banking systems. Yet, as the following
comparison with modern banking systems demonstrates, this IBS is
remarkably similar on a number of important points.
Both hundi/hawala and formal payment transactions share an
obligation to discharge,54 but where modern payment systems operate by
conforming to a series of regulations and legal instructions, this IBS
is regarded as being bound by nothing more than a code of honour
and reciprocal trust amongst hawaladars55 (hawala dealers). This
circumstance is quite alien to modern commercial transactions where
formalised legal parameters are regarded as essential to safeguarding
financial interests and accountability. The label informal is, however,
premised on a rather narrow conception of trust—a kind of ethical
altruism. It is important to distinguish between calculative trust
and altruistic trust, where the latter is decidedly more risky than
the former. It involves having faith in a largely unknown quantity,
motivated by benevolence or idealism. Altruistic trust, we can reason,
is much more likely to result in oral agreements which have weak or
no penalty mechanisms built in. Calculative trust, on the other hand,
is premised on weighing up the costs and benefits of a given quantity,
and making a decision based on a number of penalties or fail-safes
built into the agreement.
Hundi/hawala networks are typical of mercantile networks in which
‘trust is related to expectations about behaviour and has to do
ultimately with reputation’.56 The point about such a reliance on
reputation is that it is not premised on altruistic trust, but rather
on concrete information flows within given mercantile networks.
At their heart such networks would seem to be much more about
calculative rationality rather than trust. Or as Greif puts it, ‘the
54 Official terminology obtained from Robert Listfield and Fernando Montes-
Negret, “Modernising Payment Systems in Emerging Economies,” in The World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 1336 (Washington, D.C., 1994).
55 See Ballard, The Principles and Practice of Hawala Banking; Roger Ballard, “A
Background Report on the Operation of Informal Value Transfer Systems (Hawala)”
(2003); El Qorchi,Maimbo andWilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System; Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organisations:
A Study into So-Called Underground Banking Networks; Jost and Sandhu, “The Hawala
Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering.”
56 Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants 1750–1947: Traders of Sind from
Bukhara to Panama, p. 260.
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observed “trust” reflects a reputation mechanism among economic
self-interested individuals.’57 Of course there is an implicit trust in
the mechanism, in other words, that the flow of information will
always exist and be accurate. But such implicit trust exists with most
modern banking services, where banks or credit card companies trust
the information provided by credit reference agencies. These flows of
information might also be formally documented transactions.
Another key reason for hundi/hawala being labelled informal is the
belief that the system uses minimal58 or, quite erroneously, no59 record
maintenance. At any rate, the high level of confidentiality preserved by
hundi agents (hundiwallahs) or hawaladarsmakes detailed observations
difficult. Scrutiny of some hundiwallah/hawaladar records has
demonstrated that agents do maintain records; however, these
do not necessarily correspond to western book-keeping methods.60
Markovits describes how Sindhi merchants often kept written records
of merchant behaviour in past transactions.61 It does not require a
great leap of imagination to see similarities between this type of
documentation and modern credit reporting agencies.
The whole concept of institutional credibility is based on a form of
trust. Inmodern times, if a company is considered credible, reputation
often outweighs mere legality. The question arises, why should
a formalised reputation-based mechanism be construed as more
informal than businesseswhich are considered formal by virtue of their
legal parameters? Histories of other mercantile systems provide an
instructive reference point; Greif analyses the specific agency relations
and contractual arrangements that make reputation mechanisms
possible. Using documented evidence on eleventhcentury Maghribi
traders,Greif concludes that ‘private order’ economic institutions such
57 Avner Greif, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders,” The Journal of Economic History 49(4) (1989), p. 858.
58 Shah Cheema, Fiducitation: Hawala—Traditional Asian Remittance System
(www.fiducite.com, 2001 [cited March 2005]); available from http://www.
fiducite.com/Fiducitations/Fiducitation%20-%20Hawala%20Traditional%20Asian%
20Banking%20System.htm; Ballard, The Principles and Practice of Hawala Banking.
59 Cheema, Fiducitation: Hawala—Traditional Asian Remittance System; Praveen
Swami, “Kashmir’s Hawala Scandal,” Frontline (23 August–5 September 1997).
60 Roger Ballard, “Processes ofConsolidation and Settlement inRemittanceDriven
HawalaTransactionsBetween theUKandSouthAsia” (paper presented at theCentre
for Financial Studies and Innovation Roundtable on Hawala, London, March 2003),
pp. 3–4; Samuel Munzele Maimbo, “The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study
of the Hawala System in Afghanistan” (The World Bank, 2003), p. 12.
61 Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants 1750–1947: Traders of Sind from
Bukhara to Panama.
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as the ‘coalition’ were established to capture efficiency gains which
the market and legal system were unable to secure.62 This tallies with
the modern perception that this IBS exists because of weaknesses
in the modern banking sector. However, it goes one step further and
demonstrates the formalised nature of trust-based economic relations.
Maghribi coalition members conducted business with other agents
and merchants precisely because of economic, rather than just social,
sanctions implicit within the system.
Hundi/hawala embodied contractual relations, which reduced
transaction costs within mercantile networks. Distances breached
by a given merchant community, and levels of difficulty involved
in obtaining or exchanging either capital or goods, were reflected
in hundi/hawala interest rates, which allowed merchants to control
supply and demand. If a good or currency was in short supply,
hundi/hawala interest rates were likely to have been correspondingly
higher. For instance, in the case of the Nakarattars, Rudner writes,
‘Nakarattar bankers made collective decisions about interest rates
that standardised the cost of credit.’63 This kind of calculative
rationality pervaded all hundi/hawala transactions.
However, cultural sanctions were also strongly in evidence, for
instance, more favourable interest rates were usually available for
members of themercantile community.64 This was consistent with the
calculative rationality that members of the network would necessarily
be the most reliable borrowers or lenders. In such cases, lower
hundi interest rates amongst merchant communities ensured overall
liquidity and easy access to capital, as such, borrowing and lending
within the network was common. Rudner65 describes how British
attempts to limit the access of small Chettiar firms to credit would
have been ineffectual since borrowing amongst Chettiars was so
common. In effect smaller Chettiar firms could always borrow from
large Chettiar firms. British considerations of insolvency were quite
meaningless within mercantile networks.
As an institution that largely has many core qualities in common
withmodern payment systems, hundi/hawala has beenmisunderstood
because its sanctions and functionality have not beenwell documented.
62 Greif, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders,” pp. 866–868.
63 Rudner, Caste and Capitalism in Colonial India: The Nattukottai Chettiars, p. 95.
64 David Rudner, “Banker’s Trust and the Culture of Banking among the
Nattukottai Chettiars of Colonial South India,” Modern Asian Studies 23(3) (1989).
65 Ibid., pp. 429–430.
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In his work on the South Indian merchants known as the Nattukottai
Chettiars, Rudner highlights that traditionally, legal approaches to
hundi have been blindsided by court sanctions and judgements,
neglecting the ‘considerable negotiability’ of this instrument. This,
he argues, ‘simply ignores customary sanctions on hundi transactions
that are rigorously enforced by multilocale, multiregional and even
multinational communities of businessmen.’66
In addition to possessing the formal parameters of private order
economic institutions, this IBS is characterised by many of the
elements which the World Bank has classed as qualities required for
a payment system to operate efficiently, for example, payment certainty,
lowest cost, credit risk control, reliability, record maintenance, confidentiality,
and convenience.67 Payment certainty is high amongst hundi/hawala users,
despite lacking a legal framework. Studies conducted in the last
decade reveal that this system of calculative trust seems to extend
to relationships between hundi/hawala dealers and their customers.
Higher levels of familiarity with customers are believed to positively
influence the cost of transactions. Whilst the currency exchange
conversion rate for payment transactions between South Asia and
the United Kingdom is considered significantly more favourable than
the rate formal institutions offer,68 the exact commission charged
by hundiwallahs/hawaladars varies from customer to customer. For
hundi/hawala agents this acts as a measure of credit risk control, militat-
ing against the risks of dealing with unknown or little known parties.
In his study of hawaladars in Kabul, Maimbo points out that the
cost of transactions is also dependent on the delivery location and the
competitiveness of hawaladars within a given location. Differential
modes of transaction may be offered, as in the case of NGOs and
international aid organisations using hawala to receive funds in Kabul
from foreign locations such as Washington, D.C. Such customers use
a more rigid confirmation process, particularly given concerns about
counterfeit cash.69 In these instances, the absence of a competent
66 Rudner, Caste and Capitalism in Colonial India: The Nattukottai Chettiars,
p. 37.
67 Official terminology obtained from Listfield and Montes-Negret, “Modernising
Payment Systems in Emerging Economies.”
68 Roger Ballard, “Hawala Transformed: Remittance-Driven Transnational
Networks in the Post-Imperial Economic Order,” Centre for Applied South Asian
Studies, University of Manchester, 2004.
69 El Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Nov 2012 IP address: 158.143.193.43
HUND I /HAWALA: THE PROBLEM OF DEF IN IT ION 927
formal banking sector in Afghanistan has made the use of hawaladars
virtually indispensable.
Hundi/hawala’s processing type is also not alien to modern banking
methodologies. It broadly falls under the category of batch processing70—
a methodology which assembles a number of customer transactions
for processing and delivery, rather than dealing individually with each
transaction from the outset. Nevertheless, hawala is not only regarded
asmuch faster thanmodern batch-processed transactions but, inmany
cases, also faster than more immediatemodern payment processes. For
instance, the transfer of funds through hawala from key cities such as
Dubai and London to Kabul, can take no more than half a day, or little
longer than one day for funds transferred to more remote locations.71
In this way, like Greif’s example of eleventh-centuryMaghribi traders,
hawala/hundi as a ‘private order’ economic institution has succeeded
in capturing efficiency gains wherever the modern legal system and
market has been weak.
Approaches to Hundi/Hawala
The Development Angle
The 2005 third international hawala conference72 underscored two
core approaches to IBS: recognising the value of remittances and
controlling the system’s vulnerability to crime. Development agencies
are cognisant of the system’s efficiency gains, specifically with
reference to the many migrant workers who use the system to remit
funds back to the Indian subcontinent (and other locations) speedily
and cost-efficiently. Perceived as a corollary to the subcontinent’s
weak modern banking infrastructure, hundi/hawala is defined as
an alternative remittance system. Such agencies widely acknowledge
the positive correlation between remittances and poverty reduction,
and stress the need to view migrant worker remittances as an
important vehicle to develop financial services. They have concluded
that payment certainty, reliability, cultural convenience and lowest
70 Listfield and Montes-Negret, “Modernising Payment Systems in Emerging
Economies”, p. 4.
71 El Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System.
72 The Third International Conference on Hawala, Abu Dhabi, 2–3 April 2005.
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cost are factors driving the use of IBS. The United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development (DFID) also emphasises
the gap in efficiency between UK banks and money transmission
service providers.73
Shifting remittances from so-called ‘informal’ to ‘formal’ channels
is seen as a desirable objective by development organisations such
as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and DFID. These bodies adopt the line that
hundi/hawala is core to countries such as India and Pakistan because
they are cash-based economies. The IMFemphasises that systems such
as hundi/hawala frequently fill a critical gap in cash-based economies
which are usually characterised by limited financial capacity. Premised
on this understanding of hundi/hawala, most development agencies
have concluded that a broader range of financial services would
benefit migrant workers and their families; on a macroeconomic
basis, improved savings and investment possibilities are regarded as
providing migrant workers with better economic prospects and means
for managing financial risk.
However, if, as World Bank studies reveal, hundi/hawala channels
aremore resilient to financial shocks and function in themidst of crises
when all else fails—as with Afghanistan and Somalia—these ideas
are questionable. Moreover, part of the appeal of so-called informal
systems is the fact that they havemuch greater access to poorer people
than the formal sector has and is ever likely to have. For instance, an
independent South African consulting firm74 found that 50 percent of
27million SouthAfricans do not have bank accounts, whilst38per cent
of existing accounts fall in to the low-income category. Meanwhile, a
sizeable proportion of South African households—30 per cent - live
in traditional dwellings or informal structures, whilst only 44 per
cent of the population were found to have formal addresses including
postcodes.What is more, since this IBS is cheaper for all point-to-point
international payments, this is a market incentive that regulators and
development agencies would be hard-pressed to outdo.
73 “Sending Money Home? A Survey of Remittance Products and Services in the
United Kingdom,” (London: Report prepared for DFiD and Banking Code Standards
Board by NOP World and Profile Business Intelligence Ltd., 2005)
74 Hennie Bester, “AML/CFT in Developing Countries,” in The Third International
Hawala Conference (Abu Dhabi, 2005).
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The Evils of Hundi/Hawala
In contrast, since 11 September 2001, the ensuing ‘war against terror’
waged by the Bush administration has sharply focused attention
on hawala as a possible funding channel for militant activities.
Hundi/Hawala has for some years also been linked to a number of
other criminal activities ranging from money laundering and political
corruption to illegal trade in body parts. However, a more positive
note was struck in relation to the system at the 2005 conference. The
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) sounded a note of
caution against ‘fixating’ only on hawala and ‘missing other vulnerable
avenues’.75 BritishHMCustoms&Excise said it did not oppose IBS but
highlighted the experience of dealing with criminal money laundering
using ‘hawala techniques’.76
HM Customs & Excise critiqued the FATF—the supranational
institution which is responsible for issuing the main legislative and
regulatory guidelines on money laundering and terrorist financing: it
pointed out that one of the FATF’s core problems lay in definition.
What, it argued, were correct definitions for underground, illegal,
alternative, and formal? Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau
highlighted the many challenges it faced in regulating hawala, but
also emphasised that the system itself was not considered criminal
but rather those misusing the system. The FATF too distanced itself
from vilifying hawala, indicating instead that the system was exploited
for criminal use.
Regulators and Their Discontents
These approaches to IBS demonstrate a fundamental problem for
regulators: how does one identify systems such as hawala? This is a
critical question, and one that seriously impinges on the feasibility
of applying the FATF’s 40 Standard Recommendations and 9 Special
Recommendations (SRs), irrespective of their interpretive notes. For
instance, the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of
75 FINCEN, “Panel III,” in The Third International Hawala Conference (Abu Dhabi:
2005).
76 HM Customs & Excise, “Panel IV,” in The Third International Hawala Conference
(Abu Dhabi: 2005).
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Anti-Money Laundering Measures—MONEYVAL77—expressed a
concern with the possible use of hawala-type systems for an increase
in human smuggling and trafficking, and larger sales of counterfeited
goods found in its member countries.
A fundamental problem for most regulators is the lack of
familiarity with hawala. FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) such
as MONEYVAL expressed limited experience with hawala and the
difficulty in applying FATF Special Recommendation Six (SRVI).
Hundi/hawala falls under the FATF category Alternative Remittance
System (ARS) and is subject to SRVI. SRVI and its interpretive note
emphasises registration or licensing of hawaladars in a bid to increase
the transparency of payment flows through remittance channels such
as hundi/hawala.
Crucially, MONEYVAL found that distinguishing between so-
called formal and informal systems proved arduous. The United
States’ Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) highlighted
the complexity involved in identifying which businesses are ‘Money
Services Businesses’ (MSBs), yet another acronym which clouds
definition. FinCEN includes money transmitters, cheque cashers,
currency dealers or exchangers, issuers, sellers or redeemers of money
orders, travellers’ cheques and stored value, under the MSB banner.
The IMF, on the other hand, includes courier services, bus companies,
traders, microfinance institutions and money carried by hand through
family and friends as instances of remittance providers.
There is also the difficulty in applying SRVI to different national
and regional contexts. It could be said that hawala provides a
classic chicken and egg scenario. Which should come first—regulation
on the basis of national experiences or national compliance with
international standards?
At the conference, HM Customs & Excise advocated risk-based
regulation, a form of regulation that lies in evaluating the inherent
risks of the problem before taking action. However, the trials in
evaluating risks lie at the heart of law enforcement and financial
regulators’ problems. Since hundi/hawala is badly defined, it still
seems to mean different things to different people. Interpol, for
instance, drew attention to the differences in hawala usage; it
perceived the Indian subcontinent to have a particular problem
with invoice manipulation and gold smuggling. Pakistan’s NAB
acknowledged hundi/hawala’s vulnerability to the transit trade in
77 MONEYVAL is a sub-committee of theEuropeanCommittee onCrimeProblems
of the Council of Europe.
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narcotics from Afghanistan. Citing a United Nations (UN) report
describing an increase in the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan,
the NAB representative indicated that economic incentives for farm
opium represented a greater share of the problem than IBS itself. The
NAB also emphasised the need for global policing; much of Pakistani
criminal money ended up in the UK, which is regarded as a key hub
for money laundering. HMCustoms & Excise too expressed a concern
with the abuse of hawala by criminal cash controllers, whom they had
reason to believe were often drug traffickers.
In contrast, at the conference, Nikos Passas offered a trenchant
critique of over-regulation. He asked, ‘Are we exaggerating the risks
of mosquitoes whilst elephant-sized risks are neglected?’78 Describing
many financial controls as ‘growing regulatory tsunami’, he stressed
that whilst regulation of hawala was necessary, rash regulation would
drive hawala networks and transactions underground and alienate a
number of ethnic groups.Hewarned that erroneous counter-terrorism
regulations would increase economic and other asymmetries, create
grounds for more grievances and possibly nurture militant sentiment.
Compellingly, Passas suggested that trade was more vulnerable to
real abuse. For instance, closer scrutiny of diamond import/export
invoices showed a massive 20–30 per cent extra profit. Similarly, the
disparity between global cigarette imports and exports was shown
to have averaged an astounding 30 per cent between 1995 and 2000
(according toU.S. duty rates). Passas invited regulators to concentrate
the better part of their energies on increasing trade transparency.
This is an important point, and underscores the relevance of a strong
irrefutable historical connection between IBS and trade. However, as
development agencies and regulators focus on migrant remittances
and money laundering, the trade function has been understated to
the point of being forgotten. A proper historical understanding of IBS
raises the following questions, all of which are critical to questions of
policy and regulation: to what extent is hundi/hawala still critical to trade
from, to and within India? What is the relationship between trade using this IBS
and crime?
Not fully understanding, hundi/hawala presents major challenges
for regulatory and law enforcement agencies. For instance, howdo they
accurately identify suspicious transactions? How do they understand
IBS records and customer bases? How do they determine methods
of operation? Law enforcement agencies such as FinCEN and HM
78 Nikos Passas, “Fighting Terror With Error? Transcending Fact-Free Policy
Making”, in The Third International Hawala Conference (Abu Dhabi, 2005).
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Customs&Excisemust frequently resort to a reliance on certain broad
observed patterns of transaction. FinCEN, for example, recognises the
existence and use of cash-intensive businesses within close-knit ethnic
communities to transfer funds to and from different countries. The
conversion of bulk cash tomonetary instruments such asmoney orders,
to transfer funds abroad, is also seen as indicative of MSBs, but not
necessarily hundi/hawala.
In Operation Sparkle, HM Customs & Excise targeted an alleged
criminal network,79 which were believed to be laundering the
proceeds of drug trafficking. The Crown attempted to prosecute three
individuals for contravening the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act80 ; two
of the defendants also faced charges of conspiring to launder money
of an illicit origin.81 These two defendants were involved in the rag
trade, buying second-hand clothes from a number of suppliers in the
United Kingdom; the clothes were then shipped abroad, usually to
Pakistan. The defendants claimed that they were carrying out hawala
in the course of their garment business, rather than launderingmoney.
The Prosecution asserted that ‘money of criminal provenance was
introduced into the scheme to fund the purchase of clothing and was
later realised when the goods were sold in Pakistan.’82 The defence
had claimed that hawala was carried out to cost-efficiently remit
funds for settling invoices pertaining to the garment business. The
expert witness for defence also maintained that relationships of trust
inherentwithin hawala networkswouldmake itmuchmore difficult for
criminally acquired funds to enter the hawala system. Thus crucially,
the prosecution’s case depended ondemonstrating that the defendants
were not in fact using hawala services.
On 1 February 2006, the case was officially dismissed; core pieces of
evidence threading the prosecution’s case were inadmissible in court.
Nevertheless, the particulars of the trial raise a salient question: why
would a business opt to use hawala rather than the modern banking
system to settle invoices? The expert witness for the defence, Roger
Ballard, attempted to clarify the defendants’ use of the system; he
stated that ‘the central purpose of contemporary hawala systems is to
79 Funds were confiscated from the defendants on 11 November 2003.
80 Proceeds of Crime Act. 2002, accessed: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/
20020029.htm, February 2006.
81 Regina v. Shahid Siddiq, Abid Iqbal, Christopher Hall (2006).
82 Prosecution Case Summary (2004).
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facilitate the transfer of value between one currency and another on
a global scale.’83
Yet, no one has fully identified what the central purpose of hawala is
today, and this remains a difficult assessment given that the system
can operate anonymously and is so hard to identify. The problem in
identifying hawala also has implications for development agencies
wishing to calculate the size of remittance flows. The figures are
large but hopelessly sketchy, and guesswork remains the order of the
day. What is known is that inflows to developing countries such as
India must necessarily be balanced by flows from developing countries
to developed countries. Given that trade for centuries formed the
backbone of hundi/hawala, it seems logical that goods or services of
valuemight yetmake up the belly of hawala transactions. For instance,
according to Passas, hawala transactions might well entail: ‘payments
for imports; investment funds (in case of restrictions as, for example,
in India); services provided overseas but paid for locally; over-invoicing
of exports and bogus exports; tax evasion money; proceeds of criminal
enterprises, such as cigarette or human smuggling, drug trafficking or
any kind of fraud; contributions to militant and terrorist groups.’84
Ballard has also drawn on Greif’s coalition network theories to
claim that hawala is more difficult to penetrate (than the modern
banking system) by criminals because of the reputation mechanism
amongst hawaladars. He maintains that ‘it is in every hawaladar’s
personal interest to sustain his reputation for probity vis-a`-vis clients
and colleagues’.85 The old adage honour among thieves springs to mind
here! There are essentially many levels of probity amongst networks,
and many networks, and it is quite unlikely that all hundi/hawala
networks are beyond turning a blind eye to a profitable situation or
client. Furthermore, since the original hundi/hawala operators were
in fact prominent merchant or business communities, is it not entirely
83 Roger Ballard, “Methods of Account Settlement Utilised by Transnationally
Oriented Pakistani Businesses: An Expert Report” (2006), p. 11.
84 Nikos Passas, Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate
Them? (US Department of State International Information Programs, 2003 [cited
February 2006]); available from http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Hawala_
and_Other_Informal_Value_Transfer_Systems_How_to_Regulate_Them.html. See
also Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organisations: A Study
into So-Called Underground Banking Networks (Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 1999),
p. 2.
85 Ballard, “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity
Within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The Operational Dynamics of
Contemporary Hawala Networks,” p. 344.
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possible that many of the import and export businesses are conducted
by the very same hundi/hawala networks?
The challenge of defining hundi/hawala is by no means
straightforward. However, an accurate understanding of the system
must yield important benefits to policymakers and regulatory
authorities. In this discussion, I have sought to cut through much
of the confusion surrounding the terms hundi and hawala to establish
that they are essentially the same, and are similarly endowed with
a complex range of functions. By weaving together some important
historical and linguistic threads, it becomes clearer that both are
more accurately described as an indigenous banking system. The term
informal does not effectively articulate the self-regulating reputation
mechanism that lies at the heart of the system. Instead, it links back
to colonial administrators’ inability to come to grips with a proper
understanding of IBS.
This historical tapestry reveals that Indian merchants were the
chief indigenous bankers whose trade formed the primary function
of hundi/hawala. Contemporary voices are so painstakingly attentive
to the system’s remittance function, and vulnerability to organised
crime, that this connection to trade has largely been overshadowed.
There is an implicit assumption that such trade as existed, which
formerly made up the life-blood of the hundi/hawala system, has since
declined. This assumption has never been validated, and cases thrown
up by Customs & Excise for instance are indicative that trade, to and
from the Indian subcontinent via IBS, is alive and well. If so, this will
have enormous macro- andmicroeconomic implications, and lays bare
fertile terrain for additional important research into the history of
Indian trade networks. Such future research will hopefully bridge the
gap in understanding why and how private order institutions such as
hundi/hawala have evolved, and continue to evolve over time.
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